Abstract. An Attribute Based Searchable Encryption Scheme (ABSE) is a public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) where each user owns a set of attributes, and the senders decide on a policy. The policy is a function of these attributes expressed as a predicate and determines, among the users of the system, who is eligible to decrypt and search the ciphertext. Only members who own sufficient attributes to satisfy that policy can send the server a valid search query. In our work we introduce the concept of a secure ABSE by defining the functionalities and the relevant security notions.
Introduction
Searchable encryption (SE) is an encryption scheme that supports keyword based retrieval of documents. The main challenge of SE is to allow third parties to search the ciphertexts without giving them decrypting capabilities. This has been an active research area for more than a decade. Song et al. [5] proposed the first scheme that enables searchability in symmetric encryption while Boneh et al. [2] introduced a scheme for public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS).
Searchable encryption schemes assume that the user sending the search query owns the decryption key and that the sender has to know the identity of the user querying the data in order to encrypt using the corresponding encryption key. This raises the question, what if the encrypted data is shared between several receivers and is kept in a remote shared storage that is not trusted for confidentiality?
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [4] addresses this problem. An ABE is a scheme in which each user is identified by a set of attributes, and some function of those attributes, the policy, is used to decide on decryption capabilities. The two types of ABE schemes are: key-policy and ciphertext-policy [3, 1] . This paper defines a new primitive attribute based searchable encryption (ABSE). In ABSE senders decide on a policy that determines user's eligibility not only for decrypting but also for searching the data. Unlike existing proposals in the literature [6] , ours is based on a hybrid system of key and cipher policy which gives more flexibility, a strong security, and allows for multi-authorities.
E who uploads the data and sets the policy. The querier Q who wants to search the server and download documents. Many attribute authorities AT each responsible of a set of attributes and that give out private keys to users owning these attributes. TSetup(k) → (PP, UMK) : Run by T T P to set up the system. Takes a security parameter k and outputs public parameters P P and a user master key UMK which is kept secret. AddUser(PP, UMK) → (RK i , SK i ) : Run by T T P every time a user registers with the system. It outputs a registration key RKi that will be used to register with attribute authorities and servers. It outputs SKi that is secret to the user and will be used in creating trapdoors. ASetup(PP) → (AMK j , APK j ) : Run by AT to set up the attribute authority. It outputs an attribute master key AM Kj which is secret to AT and is used to create attribute private keys when users register. It also outputs an attribute public key AP Kj which is used in building the policies and is public to all. AttG(RK i , AMK j ) → ASK i,j : Run by AT to register a user i, and outputs an attribute private key ASKi,j that will be used in proving possession of attribute j.
PrdG(Ψ, AP) → (STΨ, ITΨ) : Given a predicate Ψ and a list of attribute public keys
, the algorithm generates a searching token STΨ that will be used in creating trapdoors and an indexing token ITΨ used for creating searchable ciphertext. PrdVK(Ψ) → VTΨ : Run by S. For each predicate in the system the server creates a verification token V TΨ that is kept secret to the server. PrdQT(Ψ, VTΨ, RK i , AP) → QT i,Ψ : Run by the S. Given a predicate verification token V TΨ and a registration key RKi, the server outputs a query token QTi,Ψ that allows the user i to search for keywords encrypted under the predicate Ψ . On the Security of ABSE The security notions of an ABSE are: correctness, security against Attribute Based Chosen Keyword Attack (ACKA) and security against Attributes Forgeability Attacks (AFA). We need three game models to define these notions (See Figures 1(a), 1(b), 1(c) ) where the adversary is given access to certain oracles and a trace of the responses is recorded. Both are explained below. Figure 1(a) explains the details. Formally, the ABSE is said to be correct if for a security parameter k and all polynomial time adversaries A the following advantage is negligible: Adv
A (k) = 1]| Attribute Based Chosen Keyword Attacks. We define security for an ABSE in the sense of semantic-security. The aim is to ensure that an encryption ABSE does not reveal any information about keyword W except to a Q who satisfies the policy and can create trapdoors. We define the security against an active attackers A whose given access to a set of oracles shown in Figure 1(b) . Let the advantage of winning the game be defined as follows: Adv Attribute Forgeability Attack. This security notion captures forgeability of trapdoors where the adversary can produce a trapdoor without having the sufficient attribute set that satisfies the predicate Ψ . The adversary is given access to the oracles described in Figure 1 
Conclusion
We define a new ABSE scheme and the security notions required. A working construction and security proofs are provided in a full version of this paper.
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